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Abstract 
This paper examines how the institutional settings affect earnings management of 
diversified firms. The organization complexity of diversified firms increases the 
complexity of the information process which gives the opportunistic managers an 
opportunity to manipulate their performance for pursuing their personal interests. 
However, the managers’ opportunism could be eliminated by institutional settings, 
including the legal system of the country, accounting standards, ownership 
structure. Our results show that outside investor right and IFRS adoption could 
lead shareholders to watch out for the cross-subsidization problem and scrutinize 
segment financial information. This behavior of shareholders will effectively limit 
the incentive of managers to manage earnings. Once discretionary accruals of each 
segment decrease while the cancellation effect of accruals remains, the level of 
discretionary accrual will even lower than that would be if only cancellation effect 
of segment accruals exist. Additional test provides some evidences of prerequisite 
for our inference. 
